

## FROM INDIGENISATION TO NIGERIANISATION: A LOOK AT THE PROCESS OF DE-COLONISATION OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY, 1948-1965

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### Abstract

*The colonial army in Nigeria was constituted and developed on a policy of indigenisation. The policy ensured that the rank and file of the army was composed mainly of indigenous Nigerians, led by a small proportion of British officers and Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs). From 1948 to 1956 the indigenisation policy resulted in a remarkable reduction of British officers and NCOs and the commissioning of Nigerians as officers for the first time. The indigenisation programme of this period, which has been wrongly regarded as "Nigerianisation", was, significantly, not aimed at preparing the army for independence. However, it laid the foundation for the Nigerianisation and decolonisation of the army. From 1956 to 1965 the policy of indigenisation gave way to a Nigerianisation policy in which all British and other foreign personnel in the army were rapidly replaced by Nigerians. Unlike the indigenisation policy, whose objective was to merely reduce the proportion of British officers and NCOs within the colonial system, Nigerianisation was targeted at the complete decolonisation and independence of the army. Thus, there was a rapid rundown of British and other foreign personnel, resulting in complete decolonisation and takeover of the army by Nigerians in 1965. Although Nigerianisation was accomplished as scheduled, it was marked by conflicts, which were not satisfactorily resolved within its duration.*

### Introduction

The appointment of John Beecroft as the British consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra in 1849 was a response of the British government to calls from British traders on the Niger coast for the protection of their trade and settlement of

their disputes with indigenous African traders. It also marked the beginning of British imperial governance of the bights. Beecroft's efforts to settle trade disputes between British and African traders through the courts of equity he constituted became increasingly ineffectual, as more conflicts arose from British traders' endeavours to break through the cordon of the African middlemen for direct trade with the interior markets. From 1859 to 1861 further calls were made for the use of coercion in the settlement of conflicts between British and African traders and for the protection of trade. The calls came from such leading British figures as Navy Captain John Glover, MacGregor Laird, Lord Palmerston, and W. H. Whylde as well as from the Manchester Cotton Supply Association.<sup>1</sup>

It was at the time and climate of these calls that Lagos was occupied and annexed by the British between 1861 and 1862. The annexation of Lagos as a British colony created further security and military challenges, which in 1862 occasioned its governor, Henry Stanhope Freeman, to seek approval from the British government for the raising of a colonial force in Lagos. Following receipt of the approval, Freeman enlisted 25 freed Hausa slaves from Lagos in February, 1863, to begin the first unit of a colonial force, known as Lagos Constabulary, which developed into what became the Nigerian Army much later. From 1863 to 1956 this force was developed on a policy of indigenisation. However, from 1956 to 1965 it was driven on another policy known as Nigerianisation.

Indigenisation and Nigerianisation have been two most misunderstood and confused concepts in the historiography of the Nigerian military. Robin Luckham, in his sociological analysis of authority and revolt in the Nigerian military of

1960-1966, uses the two concepts as if they are exactly the same; indeed, he uses them interchangeably.<sup>2</sup> N.J. Miners, in his study of the Nigerian Army from 1956 to 1966, also handles the concept of Nigerianisation as if it is the synonym of indigenisation. His periodisation of Nigerianisation from 1949 to 1965<sup>3</sup> suggests how inadequate his understanding of the nuances between the two concepts is. In the same vein, works on the Nigerian Army by the Nigerian Army itself incorrectly treat the indigenisation of the officer corps from 1948 to 1956 as Nigerianisation.<sup>4</sup>

This paper argues that the indigenisation of the Nigerian Army from 1948 to 1956 and the Nigerianisation of 1956-1965 were two different concepts and policies. More importantly, the paper looks critically at how the decolonisation of the Nigerian Army was achieved through the Nigerianisation of both the officer corps and the rank and file.

### **Indigenisation: the Foundation for Nigerianisation and Decolonisation**

The colonial army in Nigeria was composed mainly of African soldiers, led by a small ratio of British officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). This composition was kept because it was easier to obtain Africans as soldiers and much cheaper to maintain them than British personnel. From 1863 to 1956 the policy of indigenisation held sway, and it sustained a colonial army with Africans as the bulk. Without engaging indigenous Africans as soldiers, the colonial army could either hardly or not have been. That is why indigenisation remained the *locus classicus* in the script of the colonial army in Nigeria.

The indigenisation of the army, particularly in the period, 1948-1956, was significant for three main reasons.

First, it achieved a remarkable reduction of the British NCOs in the army. Second, for the first time, it produced a small body of budding African commissioned officers, unlike in the period, 1879-1901, when Africans were merely appointed "Native Officers" without commission.<sup>5</sup> Third; it prepared ground for the Nigerianisation and decolonisation of the army. Let us examine briefly how these developments took place from 1948 to 1956.

The indigenisation policy in this period was mostly targeted at the rank and file of the army. First and foremost, all the men were indigenous Africans. The policy made no compromise on this at any time. This was not so with the NCOs (or other ranks) – a good number of whom were British. For this cadre of the force, the indigenisation policy was, as from 1948 to 1956, aimed at effecting a "considerable reduction of the British NCOs, who will be retained in the administrative and special training appointments."<sup>6</sup> To achieve the desired reduction, many of the British NCOs, with general duties appointments in the five battalions of the army were replaced with the Nigerian NCOs.

The British NCOs in the battalions were usually engaged in the "technical duties of the units, such as pay, vehicle repairs, signals, education and specialist instruction."<sup>7</sup> The Nigerian NCOs on the other hand were gradually trained to take over entirely these duties. For example, by 1951 the establishment of the British NCOs for each of the five battalions of the army was 22. By 1956, as a result of their replacement with Nigerians, the number had been reduced to 12.<sup>8</sup> This represented a reduction of about 46% within five years. However, the British NCOs in units where they were most critically required were retained. Such units included the depot, base units, headquarters, and support units.

The replacement of British NCOs with Nigerians came as a result of the need to relieve British military personnel, who had been scarce since the end of the World War II, for duties elsewhere. It was also done to reduce the post-war strain on British financial resources, as it was far more expensive to employ British NCOs than to train and retain Nigerian NCOs. The disparity in the cost of employing the two categories of NCOs is stated by Miners in the following words:

*There was a vast difference in pay and privileges between British NCOs and warrant officers and their Nigerian counterparts. For example, an African RSM drawing full allowances received less than £20 a month, travelled second-class on the railway and had to pay for his wife to travel with him. But a British Army sergeant whose wife was with him in Nigeria was paid more than £20 a week, travelled first-class and had leave passages paid for his wife and children.<sup>9</sup>*

It can be seen from the foregoing that up to 1956 the policy of indigenising the other ranks neither addressed the question of, nor contemplated complete replacement of all British NCOs with Nigerians. Its ultimate objective was to substantially reduce British NCOs in the battalions for the reasons given supra.

The indigenisation policy was more significantly applied in the officer corps where, for the first time, Nigerians became commissioned officers. The policy, as it affected officers in the British colonial forces in West Africa, was clearly stated in 1949 in the House of Commons as follows:

*His Majesty has approved that permanent and short service commissions shall be granted to West African land forces with the same powers as exist for European officers.... Furthermore commissions are now being thrown open to Africans in the Army and there is desire to absorb school-leaving children who wish to make a career and become young African officers.*<sup>10</sup>

It was to implement this policy that the first Nigerian, Lt. Lord Victor Ugboma, was commissioned in 1948; followed by Lts. W.U. Bassey, Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, S.A. Ademulegun, Shodeinde, among others. By mid-1956, about 17 Nigerians had been commissioned, even though one of them had died and three more had left the army, leaving a balance of 13 officers. This amounted to an average of two commissions per year from 1948 to 1956.

It has been wrongly suggested, and indeed assumed, that Nigerianisation started with these early commissions. For Miners, for instance, the year, 1949, was the beginning of the Nigerianisation of the officer corps.<sup>11</sup> It is important to note, against this assumption, that the commissioning of Nigerian officers from 1948 to 1956 was not Nigerianisation but indigenisation because, it was not carried out with the objective of handing over the army as an independent force to Nigerians. Its objective was to raise Nigerian officers with which to meet British military manpower requirements in the postwar era. Moreover, Nigerian officers would be cheaper to maintain, and they would be more efficient in the tropical economic, social, and physical environment of Nigeria. Thus, economy and efficiency, rather than any plan for

independence, animated the indigenisation of the officer corps in the period, 1948-1956. Brigadier W.U. Bassey, the second Nigerian to be commissioned as an officer in 1949, obviously affirmed this when he recalled the circumstances in which he became an officer. According to him:

*I went to England for weapons training course in 1947, coming out with a distinction in weapons. When the result came, the general in Accra promised me a commission for my good performance. So the point is that we became officers on our individual efforts. There was no conscious decision on the part of the British to prepare us for any takeover.<sup>12</sup>*

### **Nigerianisation: the Road to Independence**

Nigerianisation was a policy, adopted in the mid-1950s, by which all British personnel in the Nigerian Army were replaced with Nigerians within a targeted period of about 10 years. Its objective was to completely decolonise the army and hand it over to Nigerians as an independent force. Captain, later Professor, David Chandler situates Nigerianisation within this context. He writes: "By way of preparation for independence status, it was clearly necessary to adopt a policy of 'Nigerianisation' in the army to ensure a smooth hand-over of power in 1960."<sup>13</sup> Thus Nigerianisation was defined and driven by the cardinal objective of independence, instead of by economy and efficiency as was the case with indigenisation policy up to 1956. Indeed Nigerianisation was immutably definitive and conclusive in this objective.

Nigerianisation was one of the major national problems which Sir James Robertson quickly identified on his

assumption of office as the Governor-General of Nigeria in June, 1955. According to him:

*The...problem was how best to prepare the services for independence by pushing Nigerians into the higher posts. It seemed clear when I reached Nigeria in 1955 that independence would come within a few years; and yet the great majority of senior officials were still expatriate and if this was so in the Civil Service, the position was worse in the police and the army. It seemed to me that an independent Government would certainly wish that the great bulk of its officers and officials should be composed of its own nationals.<sup>14</sup>*

Once identified as a problem, the Nigerianisation of the army began to receive attention from 1956. This initial attention, which came mainly from within the army, was leisurely paid until 1960,<sup>15</sup> when concerted efforts were focused headlong on Nigerianisation as a national problem. For instance, by 1960, as Col. Bates wrote: "The officer corps was... still 75% British and the problem of Africanisation was only just beginning to be talked."<sup>16</sup>

### **Nigerianisation of the Rank and File**

The Nigerianisation of the rank and file of the Nigerianisation Army was not much of a problem as all the men, with the bulk of the NCOs, were already Nigerians by 1956, thanks to the long established policy of indigenisation, which had made this possible. In 1956 there were only 336 British NCOs out of 6,400 other ranks in the army.<sup>17</sup> They were engaged especially in technical duties, pay units, auto



repairs, signals, and education services. The post World War II indigenisation programme earlier mentioned in the study was mainly responsible for the reduced ratio of British NCOs by 1956. The indigenisation policy, therefore, facilitated and quickened the complete replacement of British NCOs with Nigerians under the Nigerianisation programme.

The complete Nigerianisation of the other ranks was targeted for 1961.<sup>18</sup> To achieve this target, Nigerian NCOs were, as from 1956, trained to replace the remaining 336 British NCOs. By 1960, as Baites has pointed out:

*Africanisation [Nigerianisation] of the other ranks structure of the Nigerian Army was almost complete. The only BNCOs [British NCOs] remaining were very few technicians and it had been found difficult to find suitable replacement for them.*<sup>19</sup>

However, by 1962 the replacement of British NCOs had been completed.

### **Nigerianisation of the Officer Corps**

By recruiting and training more cadets, it was possible, as from 1956, to progressively increase the strength of Nigerian officers and to rapidly run down the British personnel to the last officer by 1965. In 1959 the army headquarters indicated that the Nigerianisation of the officer corps was programmed for completion by April, 1965.<sup>20</sup> This date was confirmed with marginal difference by the defence headquarters in 1962, which announced that the Nigerianisation of the army would be completed by March, 1956.<sup>21</sup>

With this target in view, the number of Nigerian officers was increased from 14 in 1956 to 32 in 1958.<sup>22</sup> By mid

1959 more officers had been commissioned. As Foster, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) the Royal Nigerian Military Forces in 1959, would put it: "At the time (May, 1959) of my arrival, there was [sic] only 40 Nigerian officers out of a total of 290".<sup>23</sup> The strength of Nigerian officers further increased to 61 out of 283 in October, 1960.<sup>24</sup> As more cadets were sent for training in the Common Wealth countries and to fill up the increased Nigerian vacancies at Sandhurst and Mons after independence, the number of Nigerian officers gradually shot up to 150 by January, 1962.<sup>25</sup> The introduction of direct commissions, executive commissions, and nursing commissions resulted in the commissioning of a whopping 119 Nigerian officers within a short period. These commissions, together with those obtained from the continuous training of cadets for regular combatant and short service combatant commissions, dramatically increased the proportion of Nigerian officers to 283 out of a total of 332 by 1 June, 1963.<sup>26</sup> Out of the remaining 49 non-Nigerians, which included 42 British officers, six Pakistani officers, and one U.S. officer, 47 were replaced with Nigerian officers before the end of April, 1965, leaving only one British officer, who was not replaced until August, 1965, and one Pakistani officer, who left at the end of the year.

The progress in the implementation of the Nigerianisation programme did not consist only in the rolling out of Nigerian officers but also in pushing them up to the higher positions vacated by the British officers. Up to mid-1959 no Nigerian officer was commanding any unit beyond the level of the platoon. This situation began to change between late 1959 and early 1960, when, "in order to hasten the process, several officers, including Ironsi and

Ademulegun, were given command of companies."<sup>27</sup> This move was to prepare the officers for battalion command.

Thereafter rapid progress was made in relinquishing control of the army bureaucracy to Nigerian officers. As a result of this, the first generation of Nigerian officers were given rapid promotions. For instance, Ironsi and Ademulegun were promoted brigadier on 15 December, 1962, and Ogundipe became acting brigadier on 8 January, 1963. Bassey, Shodeinde, Abebayo, Fajuyi, Kur Mohammed, and Imo were appointed substantive lieutenant-colonels by mid 1963, while Effiong, Njoku, Pam, Ojukwu, and Gowon were following closely as acting lieutenant-colonels by June, 1963. However, it may be obvious to state that Ojukwu had attained that rank six months earlier than Gowon. These promotions would have obviously made it possible for the Nigerian officers to take over the key appointments and higher commands in the army, and by the end of 1963 all company, battalion, and brigade commanders were Nigerians. With the hand-over date less than two years ahead, only the skeletal presence of the British and other non-Nigerian officers, could be reckoned with.

By 1964 the situation had further improved towards complete Nigerianisation of the officer corps. No British officer was in any of the infantry battalions.<sup>28</sup> All the battalions were completely Nigerianised, and the minuscule body of the British officers left was divided between the army headquarters, the Nigerian Military Training College, headquarters of brigades, and the training depot. By January, 1965, the GOC, Major-General Christopher E. Welby-Everard, the last most critical British officer to leave, was preparing his hand-over notes. He departed in February, 1965, leaving behind only one British officer, an engineer, who left in August, and one Pakistani officer, who left as medical

personnel at the end of the year. In March 1965 the newly promoted Nigerian Major-General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi Ironsi, took over the supreme command of the Nigerian Army. Thus ended the foreign command, the Nigerianisation of the army, and one hundred and two years of direct and eventful British military presence in Nigeria.

### **The Vexed Issues Arising from Nigerianisation**

Nigerianisation was accelerative, aberrational, and political, especially in the recruitment, training, promotion, and pushing up of Nigerian officers for command and leadership positions. These characteristics naturally made it a controversial and emotive policy in the national discourse, especially after independence. Given its controversial nature, Nigerianisation was not accomplished without conflict. There were two main areas of conflict. The first was the conflict over the introduction of regional quotas for the enlistment of officers and men.<sup>29</sup> The prelude to this was in 1960, when ethnic balance was introduced as a criterion for the selection of potential cadets by the Nigerian Military Training College. The selection board of the college was directed to ensure, that "where there are potential cadets of equal merit, consideration may be given by the board to the ethnic balance between regions."<sup>30</sup> When this criterion, which was dependent on the fortuity of having "equal merit", could not be used to effect the desired ethnic balance in favour of the Northern Region, the Minister of Defence, Ribadu, insisted in 1961 that a regional quota system should be adopted in the recruitment and commissioning of officer cadets.

Under the quota policy, it was strictly specified and directed as follows: "in future 50 percent of all cadets must be from the North, and this is to apply to the initial selection

board and to the final pass list, whatever the order of merit."<sup>31</sup> The remaining 50 percent was to be shared equally between the East and the West. With this policy the proportion of the North in the officer corps, which stood at 14% at the time of independence, went up to 32.5% by January, 1966.<sup>32</sup> In 1963, the policy of regional quotas was also applied to the recruitment of men into the army. Thus all intakes into the army must reflect 50% for the North, 25% for the East, 21% for the West, and 4% for the Mid-West.<sup>33</sup>

It was officially explained by the minister of defence that the adoption of the regional quotas for the enlistment of both officers and men was to ensure that the different sections of the country were fairly represented in the army in order "to create an awareness in all sections of the community of their responsibilities for the defence of the borders of this country."<sup>34</sup> The minister of state for the army, Alhaji Tako Galadima, further explained:

*We introduced a quota system in the army thus preventing the possible fear that the army would sometime become unreliable. If any part of the country is not represented in the army, we may harbor some fear that a particular section will begin to feel that it is being dominated. But now... this country's safety is assured.*<sup>35</sup>

In spite of these explanations, many officers within the army deprecated the policy. On one side, Northern officers and men loathed the reduction in the proportion of Northerners, who, before the introduction of the policy, constituted about 80% of the soldiers in the rank and file of the army.<sup>36</sup> On the other side, Southern officers, especially those from the East, were obsessed with the adoption of a quota policy which bastardised competition to the advantage of the North. The

implementation of the quota policy occasioned the application of discriminatory and double standards especially in the recruitment, training, and promotion of officers. It also nurtured regionalism, ethnicity, and partisan cleavages within the army.<sup>37</sup>

The second area of conflict was in the speed with which Nigerianisation was to be carried out. There was a mutual polarity of opinion on the length of time required for the completion of the Nigerianisation process. The Nigerian Army officers and members of the federal parliament from the South, along with the Eastern Region government newspaper, the *Nigerian Outlook*, wanted Nigerianisation to be completed soon after independence. Specifically, they expected Nigerianisation to be completed in 1962. It was thought that after General Foster, who would leave on the expiration of his contract as GOC in February, 1962, either Ironsi or Ademulegun would be appointed to take over the command of the army. When this did not happen, and another British officer was being proposed to take over from General Foster, the *Nigerian Outlook* complained:

*Are we to believe that if either Lt. Col. Ironsi or Lt. Col. Ademulegun was appointed to take over command of the Nigerian forces that [sic] Northern Nigeria would one day be invaded by the South? Or could it be inferred that since one of the most important ministries - Defence Ministry - is under the control of a Northerner and perhaps there is no Northerner yet qualified to command the Nigerian Forces, then the post of commander must continue to be occupied by expatriates?*<sup>38</sup>

As evident from the complaint, the political leadership of the North, represented by Ribadu, and the British officers preferred a much later date for the completion of the Nigerianisation programme. Thus, in spite of the public opinion and a parliamentary motion, which came out strongly in favour of an accelerated and shortened programme for Nigerianisation, Ribadu insisted that Nigerianisation should not move faster than normal, pointing out that:

*The motion underrates the difficulties, the qualifications and experience required for the efficient running of modern Army.... We do not want another Mobutu in Nigeria.... I appeal to both sides of the house not to bring politics into the Armed Forces.*<sup>39</sup>

The British officers, posing professionally, held the same opinion as Ribadu, which the GOC, General Welby-Everard, clearly expressed thus: "In fact politically it was desirable that British officers should go after independence. But it would have been militarily expedient for them to leave ten years after"<sup>40</sup> Thus, the British opinion looked up to 1970 as the completion date for Nigerianisation.

The concordance of opinion between the Northern political leadership and the British officers on the length of Nigerianisation was borne from a coincidence of interests, not from collaboration between them. The contemporary perception was that Ribadu wanted an elongation of the Nigerianisation process in order to allow time for a Northern officer to qualify for the command of the army. The British were suspected of contriving a lengthened programme for Nigerianisation for pecuniary objectives, as that offered them an opportunity for more service for pay from Nigeria. The

suspicion, deep-seated especially among officers from the South, was well expressed by an officer from the East, Brig. W. U. Bassey:

*The allocation of the small quota for the training of Nigerians at Sandhurst was a delay tactic of the British. The more we do not have the indigenous officers, the more the British would come and serve in the army.*<sup>41</sup>

The conflict over the duration of the Nigerianisation programme was eventually resolved when it was declared in 1962, that Nigerianisation would be completed by March, 1965, the same date suggested in 1959 in the Report of the Select Committee on Nigerianisation.<sup>42</sup>

### **Conclusion**

It has been established that indigenisation and Nigerianisation were two different stages in the evolution of the Nigerian Army. Although, indigenisation in the period, 1948-1956, was associated with the commissioning of Nigerians as officers and the taking over of the duties of many British NCOs by Nigerian NCOs, it was neither aimed at complete replacement of British personnel nor at preparing the army for independence. Indeed, the concern of the indigenisation policy was to enhance, strengthen, and sustain the colonial hold on the army, not to dismantle it.

On the other hand, Nigerianisation was a decolonisation process in which all British and other foreign personnel in the army were replaced with Nigerians within a targeted period, and its aim was to prepare the army for complete independence. It was directed ultimately at the liquidation of the colonial sub-structure. Thus even though



indigenisation and Nigeriansation entailed the replacement of British personnel with Nigerians, the two policies were different both in conceptualisation and objective. However, because the replacement of British personnel with Nigerians was common to both policies, indigenisation naturally prepared the grounds for the take-off of Nigerianisation.

This does not mean that Nigerianisation was a product of indigenisation. Rather, it was the logical consequence of the need for Nigeria's independence in the 1950s. For this reason its implementation was reflective of the politics, controversies, and ethnic and regional cleavages that had been the hallmarks of the larger Nigerian society. Even though Nigerianisation was accomplished as planned and the army handed over as an independent force to Nigerians, the conflicts and issues associated with it were not fully settled and had, since independence in 1960, established themselves as latent threats to national unity and integration. As David Akpode Ejoor would argue:

*The process of transforming that colonial army into a national army began seriously only after [sic] independence. That process threw up problems for the army and for the nation, some of which are still with us.*<sup>43</sup>

## End Notes

- <sup>1</sup> These calls were recorded in various Foreign Office correspondences such as FO 2/34, Washington on Niger Expedition, April, 1860. FO 2/34, Laird to Russel, 25 January, 1860. FO 2/34, Executive Committee of Cotton Supply Association to Lord Palmerston, 7 February, 1860. FO 2/34, Whyld, Comments on the Washington Report, 1861.
- <sup>2</sup> Robin Luckhan, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-67* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 163-176.
- <sup>3</sup> N.J. Miniers, *The Nigerian Army 1956-1966* (London: Methuen, 1971), 33-58, 108-129.
- <sup>4</sup> Nigerian Army Education Corps and School (NAECS), *History of the Nigerian Army 1863-1992* (Abuja, Nigeria: Nigerian Army Headquarters, 1992), 100. Nigerian Army Museum, *The History of the Nigerian Army in Pictures* (Lagos, Nigeria: Directorate of Army Education, 1987), 47.
- <sup>5</sup> For more information on Native Officers, see: CO 147/438, Morning State of Houssas, 24 October, 1879. CO 147/168, Griffith to Colonial Office, February, 1886. CO 147/72, Drecton to Lord Knustford, 20 September, 1889. CO 147/106, Administrator of Lagos to Chamberlian, 20 August, 1896.
- <sup>6</sup> Anonymous, "Africanisation of Army Begins: Africans. As Officers," *Daily Service* X/I (London), Tuesday, July 1949: 302.
- <sup>7</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 21.
- <sup>8</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 20-21.
- <sup>9</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 21.
- <sup>10</sup> Anonymous, *Daily Service*, 302.

- <sup>11</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 34, 50- 51.
- <sup>12</sup> Willinton U. Basse, Interview with the author, No 16 Utang Street, Uyo, Nigeria, 20 August, 1988.
- <sup>13</sup> David Chandler, Private Letter to I.O. Ewa, 29 November, 1988.
- <sup>14</sup> James Robertson, "The Governor as the Man in the Middle," in *Africa in the Colonial Period: The Transfer of Power: The Colonial Administrator in the Age of Decolonisation* ed. A.H.M Kirk-Greene (Oxford: University of Oxford, 1979), 40.
- <sup>15</sup> This has been demonstrated by Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 33-58.
- <sup>16</sup> RHLO (Rhodes House Library Oxford), Bates, MSS. Afr.s 1734 Box 1, (27). 14.
- <sup>17</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 15, 20.
- <sup>18</sup> H.A.W. Stacpoole, "Nigeria's Own Army: The Nigerian Military Forces under Federal Control," *British Army Review* No. 8, March, 1959. See also RHLO, RWAFF, Father Albert Stacpoole, MSS Afr. S. 1734, Box 11, (37). 1957-1959.
- <sup>19</sup> RHLO, Bates, 60.
- <sup>20</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 108.
- <sup>21</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 109.
- <sup>22</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 49.
- <sup>23</sup> N.L.Foster, "Nigeria 1959-1962," private paper, 1992, 8.
- <sup>24</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 108.
- <sup>25</sup> Foster, Nigeria, 10.
- <sup>26</sup> Royal Nigerian Army Seniority Roll of Nigerian and Contract Officers, 1st June, 1963.
- <sup>27</sup> Foster, Nigeria, 10.
- <sup>28</sup> M.M. Cruicshank of Auchreoch, Interview with the author, London, 14 December, 1988.

- <sup>29</sup> John Hatch, *Nigeria: A History* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1970), 236.
- <sup>30</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 166.
- <sup>31</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 166
- <sup>32</sup> D.M Jemibewon, "Military Administration and the Nigerian Army" paper presented at the National Conference on 20 Years of Nigerian Public Administration, October 1960-October 1980, Faculty of Administration, University of Ife, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 13-16 October, 1980.
- <sup>33</sup> Okon Eminue, *Military in Politics* (Uyo, Nigeria: Soulmate, 2006), 113.
- <sup>34</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 100.
- <sup>35</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 100.
- <sup>36</sup> N.L. Foster, Interview with the author, Aldershort, England, 20 November, 1988.
- <sup>37</sup> For how this happened, see Ibiang Oden Ewa, "The Politicisation of the Nigerian Military 1960-1965," *Journal of African Politics and Society* Vol. 2 No. 1 (June, 2013): 115-116. See also his "A History of the Nigerian Army 1863-1966," Ph.D Thesis, Department of History and International Studies, University of Calabar, Nigeria, 2010, 497-503.
- <sup>38</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 109.
- <sup>39</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 108.
- <sup>40</sup> Christopher E. Welby-Everard, Interview with the author, Lincolnshire, England, 25 October, 1988.
- <sup>41</sup> Bassey, Interview.
- <sup>42</sup> Miners, *Nigerian Army*, 108-109.
- <sup>43</sup> David Akpode Ejoor, *Reminiscences* (Lagos, Nigeria: Malthouse Press Limited, 1989), 17.