


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THE PROSECUTION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELEVANT LEGAL REGIME

by

*Dr. Tijani Nasiru, Ph.D**

Abstract

The courts play a crucial role in the fight against 'terrorism and terrorism financing.' Terrorists when arrested are usually brought before a court of law to determine their guilt or innocence, within a possible short time. This is based on the constitutional safeguard provided by section 36 (5), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), providing that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. The Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, as amended, created terrorism offences, but however, silent on the mode of prosecution. Against this backdrop is the constitutional safeguard in prosecuting suspects within the confines of the rule of law. The paper seeks to unravel an effective means proper by prosecutors in the course of prosecuting terrorism offences within the law as well the ethics of proper prosecution? Why are there low rate of prosecution in

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Nigeria? The author therefore argues that there was a huge task in the light of prosecutorial duties and challenges in the prosecution of various aspects of terrorism, terrorism financing and related offences such as money laundering in a complex society such as Nigeria. The paper therefore maintains that there are guiding regulations that should assist the prosecutor in the effective prosecution of terrorism and other related offences. Furthermore, that there is the need for further training, procurement of relevant equipments, proper investigation and manpower development on the part of the prosecutors, judges and other stakeholders in the administration of criminal justice.

Key Words: Terrorism, Terrorism Financing, Money Laundering, Prosecution, Prosecutors

Introduction

With the promulgation of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 and the subsequent amendment in 2013,¹ the Nigerian Government had taken steps to create a legal framework for the prevention and combating terrorism in Nigeria. Although the Act does not define terrorism, it enumerates what constitute 'terrorism acts' The Attorney General of the Federation is now designated as the both the prosecuting agency and the prosecuting authority.² However, the Act does not provide for trial and prosecution of terrorism offences. Hence recourse will be had to extant procedural laws. At the center of these are the investigators, prosecutors and the courts. Terrorists when arrested ought to be brought before a court of law to determine the guilt or innocence of the suspect within a short time. This is based on the constitutional safeguard provided by section 36(5), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. As against this constitutional safeguard is the need to prosecute suspects within the confines of the rule of law and secure conviction otherwise an otherwise guilty defendant will

¹ See the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 which was passed about a year after the principal Act.

² The Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 s 19 amending section 40 of the Principal Act. section 1A(2) of the Amendment Act gives the Attorney General of the Federation the authority for the effective implementation of the Act and strengthen and enhance the existing legal framework.

go scotch free? How can prosecutors effectively prosecute terrorism offences within the law and ethics of proper prosecution?

The aim of this paper is to consider prosecutorial duties and challenges in the prosecution of various aspects of terrorism, terrorism financing and related offences such as money laundering. In doing this, we shall consider several decisions of our appellate courts and other jurisdictions. It will be shown that, although there are guiding regulations that should assist the prosecutor in the effective prosecution of terrorism and other related offences, there is the need for further training, funding, proper investigation and manpower development on the part of the prosecutors, judges and other stakeholders in the administration of criminal justice.

Part one will examine the challenge to defining terrorism and statutory definition in Nigeria and other jurisdiction and how this affects prosecution. Part two will examine the statutory jurisdiction to try terrorism including legislative intervention to ensure effective prosecution of terrorism offences such as the practice directions of the court.³ Part three examines the ingredients of the offence and evaluate whether a conviction will depend on the statute creating the offence. Part three considers the constitutional safeguard to the trial of suspects including witness protection. The decision of courts in Nigeria on terrorism offences will be examined in part four. The challenges to effective prosecution-manpower and technical and how to overcome them will be discussed in part five. Part six will focus on conclusion and recommendations.

Conceptualizing Terrorism and problem of Prosecution

There is no universal definition of Terrorism. The question of the definition of terrorism has always been the subject of controversy amongst academic writers due to lack of uniformity in perception and statutory definition.⁴

³ See the Federal High Court Practice Direction, 2013, Court of Appeal Practice Direction, 2013 and the Supreme Court Practice Directions, 2013.

⁴ Kent Roach: "The Case for Defining Terrorism with Restraint and without Reference to Political or Religion Motive" in *Law and Liberty in the War on Terror* eds. Andrew Lynch, Edwina Macdonald, George Williams (Sydney: The Federation press, 2007) 39-49; Don John Omale, "Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Nigeria; Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons for Public Policy" [2013] 9 (3) *Canadian Social Science* 96-103; Reuven Young, "Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and its Definitions in Domestic Legislation" [2006] 29(23) *B.C Int. & Comparative Law Review* 23; Keiran Hardy & George Williams,

This is based on the popular *cliché*: One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. While some statutes attempt to define 'terrorism', others mention 'acts of terrorism'.⁵ While there is a basic consensus that terrorism has the element of criminal violence intended to intimidate a population or coerce a government or international organization, some of the laws have added an ulterior intention to pursue a political, religious or ideological cause.⁶ Most national laws have criminalized certain acts which come within 'terrorists acts' but in the domestic implementation of international conventions, certain offences such as kidnapping, murder have been elevated to terrorism.⁷ Similarly, certain international conventions have been incorporated into domestic laws on terrorism.⁸ According to Ben Saul,⁹ it was only after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 ('9/11') that most States considered enacting terrorism offences, spurred on by the perceived threat of global religious terrorism, obligations imposed by the UN Security Council, gaps in existing criminal liabilities and police powers.

The search for a legal definition of terrorism is contextually important because only an offence that meets such a definition that can be so punished. According to Honourable Justice Alaba Omolaye-Ajileye, the definition establishes the threshold of terrorism.¹⁰ Due to the legal consequences of describing someone as a terrorist or a body as a terrorist organization, there is the need to have a clear-cut definition of terrorism. Can we limit

⁵ "What is Terrorism? Assessing Domestic Legal Definitions" [2011] 16 *UCLA Int. L. & For. Aff.* 77; Geoffrey Levitt, 'Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?' [1986] 13 *Ohio N.U.L. Rev.* 97; Clive Walker, "The Legal Definition of 'Terrorism' in United Kingdom and Beyond" (2007) *Public Law* 331

⁶ See Article 1(3), OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999, section 2, The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, Article 2, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

⁷ S.2, The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2001, s. 5(2), Terrorism Suppression Act, 2002 (New Zealand)

⁸ See ss. 1, 3, Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended)

⁹ International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, International Convention against the taking of Hostages, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

¹⁰ Ben Saul, 'Defining Terrorism: A Conceptual Minefield' *Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15/84* available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2664402>

¹¹ See Alaba Omolaye-Ajileye, 'Legal Framework for the Prevention of Terrorism in Nigeria' paper presented at the 2015 Law Week programme of the Nigerian Bar Association, Lokoja Branch, on Thursday 21 May 2015.

definition of terrorism only to non-governmental groups or individuals? Can a government or its agencies such as police or army be labelled terrorists? A case of state or non-state actors. At what stage will a popular student agitation turn from mere student unionism to terrorism? Or agitation against removal of oil subsidy resulting in damage to government property.¹¹ The danger of absence of an acceptable definition in domestic law is that the state may criminalize any act or omission of persons or organizations as terrorism. It will therefore be appreciated that unless a clear-cut definition of terrorism is made, the legal framework for the war against terrorism may be political and subjective. To what extent can there be a clear-cut definition of terrorism devoid of political or religious connotation?

Where there is no clear-cut definition of terrorism, it becomes impossible to decide whether to prosecute for ordinary cases of murder, armed robbery, breach of the peace or other offences related to terrorism. A typical example is section 46 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (Establishment) Act, 2004¹² which defines terrorism as:

- (a) any act which is a violation of the Criminal Code or the Penal Code and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to –
- (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles, or
 - (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency, or
 - (iii) create general insurrection in a state.

¹¹ See: Ben Golder and George Williams "What is Terrorism"? Problems of Legal Definition' [2004] 27 (2) *UNSW Law Journal* 270.

¹² This is similar to Art 1(3) of the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. See also the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 of Tanzania, Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 identifies "terrorist acts". Section 12 is on International Terrorism.

- (b) any promotion, sponsorship of, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organization or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i), (ii) and (iii).

An examination of the above provision especially section 46(a) shows that any act which is a violation of the Criminal Code or penal code can be terrorism in so far as it:

- (a) causes serious injury or death to any person or group of persons or
- (b) causes or may cause damage to public property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles, or disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency, or create general insurrection in a state;

It is submitted that the provision can be divided into harm to individuals and harm to public interest and properties. The first part of the definition under the EFCC Act can be accommodated under the Criminal Code¹³ or the Penal Code¹⁴. Even damage to public interests and properties are already subject of punishment in extant criminal legislation without criminalizing them as terrorism.¹⁵ The dilemma for a prosecutor is whether to charge under the extant criminal legislation or charge under the EFCC Act for terrorism.

This confusion is further exacerbated by the lack of definition in the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011. The Act in section 1(1) prohibits acts of terrorism and Section 1(2) itemizes what constitutes acts of terrorism without attempting to define terrorism.¹⁶

¹³ Criminal Code Act 2004 (CCA 2004) ss 315,316,319.

¹⁴ Penal Code (PC) ss 221,224.

¹⁵ CCA 2004, ss 76, 77, 451 Criminal Law Lagos State 2015 (CL 2015) s351

¹⁶ It gives a broad definition of terrorism to include acts which may seriously harm or damage a country or an international organization; is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to - (i) unduly compel a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; (ii) seriously intimidate a

Acts of terrorism in this law can be classified into:

- (a) Acts against the government or international organization with the aim of compelling it to do or refrain from doing an act.
- (b) Intimidation whether of the government or international organization.
- (c) Causing serious bodily harm or death.
- (d) Destruction of public facilities or disruption of social facilities.
- (e) Kidnapping
- (f) Acts or omission which constitutes an offence within the scope of a counter terrorism protocol and conventions ratified by Nigeria.

The unwieldy acts of terrorism will certainly pose a challenge to prosecuting terrorism offences under the Act. As argued above, some of the offences can be prosecuted under existing legislation.¹⁷ Where any act or omission also constitutes an offence within the scope of counter terrorism protocol and conventions, it can also be tried in Nigeria as long as it has been ratified by Nigeria.¹⁸ The dilemma for the prosecutor therefore is to determine under which legislation to try a suspect. This brings to the fore the point made by Andrew Chukwuemerie as to dual or double

population; (iii) seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization; or (iv) otherwise influence such government or international organization by intimidation or coercion; and (c) involves or causes, as the case may be - (i) an attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death; (ii) kidnapping of a person; (iii) destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss; (iv) the seizure of an aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport the seizure of an aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport and diversion or the use of such means of transportation for any of the purposes in

¹⁷ For instance, causing serious bodily harm or death can be tried under the criminal code or penal code. Kidnapping can be tried under the Criminal Law of Lagos, section 269, Willful Damage to property, section 348 or endangering vessel sections 253,254, 256. See also the recent Lagos State Anti -Kidnapping Law, 2017 which prescribes death penalty for kidnapping if death results from the act. Pipeline vandalism, section 7, willful destruction of public property, section 3, Arson of public building, ship, aircraft, railway track etc, section 4, unlawful destruction of highways, section 6 etc can all be tried under the Miscellaneous Offences Act

¹⁸ See section 12, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)

criminality.¹⁹ This result is that in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, other considerations will come into play. The prosecutor may decide to charge a pipeline vandal under the Terrorism Act rather than the Miscellaneous Offences Act²⁰ or a kidnapper under the Act rather than the, Criminal Code Act or Penal Code,²¹ Criminal Law or the Anti-kidnapping Law. Prosecutorial discretion could be coloured by political considerations. While a suspect in the ruling party may be arraigned for pipeline vandalism or acts likely to cause breach of the peace or murder or culpable homicide punishable with death under the extant criminal legislation, the suspect from the opposition party will be charged under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act. There is need to curb this wrong use of the prosecutorial discretion²² to avoid political victimization.

A curious provision is in section 3 of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. It criminalizes an attack on an 'internationally protected person' without defining who is an internationally protected person. The offences created by the provision are murder, kidnap, attack on the person or liberty or carries out a violent attack on the official premises, private accommodation or means of transport of such a person in a manner likely to endanger his person or liberty.²³ It is therefore submitted that these are offences that can be tried under existing legislation. The fact that a person is regarded as an 'internationally protected person' will not make a difference if a crime is committed against a person within Nigeria. Stiffer punishment will not be an argument for creating this offence under the Terrorism Act. The offences under section 3 carry life imprisonment whereas a case of murder or culpable homicide punishable with death under the criminal code or penal code respectively carries a death penalty. It is our position that the amendment to the Terrorism Act does not assist the

¹⁹ See Andrew I. Chukwuemerie, 'International Legal War on the Financing of Terrorism': A comparison of Nigeria, UK, US and Canadian Laws' [2006] (9) (1) *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, 71, 74 and 75

²⁰ Cap M17 LFN 2004, s 1(7)

²¹ See CCA s 364 and PC s 272, 273

²² An attempt has been made in the Code of Conduct and prosecutorial guidelines for Federal prosecutors, Federal Ministry of Justice (2013).

²³ See section 3(a)(b). The Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013, does not contain the definition of internationally protected person or terrorism. It only defines acts of terrorism.

prosecutor in any way. It suffers from the same criticism as that of the EFCC Act and the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011.

Ingredients of the offence of terrorism and decisions of Courts

A critical aspect of the offence of terrorism which is said to distinguish it from other offences of similar nature is the impact of the force used which is not directed at a specific person but is meant to create intense fear and anxiety, both physical and psychological in the minds of members of the public which has the effect of coercing, forcing, intimidating them to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular view, policy or position to act according to certain principles. This was the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Musa Abdulmumini v Federal Republic of Nigeria*.²⁴ In this case, the appellant was one of several persons arraigned before and tried at the Federal High Court Jos, for conspiracy to commit terrorist acts punishable under Section 5 of the Criminal Code Act²⁵, illegal possession of firearms punishable under Section 5 of the same Criminal Code Act, and the commission of terrorist acts punishable under Section 15(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004. The alleged criminal acts were committed on or about the 8th day of March, 2008 in and around Jos and its environs, including Mangu Local Government Area of Plateau State.

The appellant featured in the first and third counts, which respectively accused him and others of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts and committing terrorist acts. In these two charges he was the 7th and 9th Accused. All the accused persons, including the appellant herein, were convicted for the two offences alleged in the 1st and 3rd charges. They were each sentenced to 2 years and 10 years' imprisonment for committing the said offences of criminal conspiracy to commit terrorist acts and the commission of terrorist acts respectively. The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeal sitting at Jos. He was unsuccessful. The said Lower Court dismissed his appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentences imposed on him by the trial Federal High Court. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the conduct of the appellant and his group while armed

²⁴ (2017) LPELR 43726 SC; see also *Adamu Ali Karumi v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2016) LPELR 40473

²⁵ Cap. C38 LFN, 2004

with dangerous weapons and going about menacingly in the area was calculated to instill fear in the members of the public and intimidate them within the meaning of terrorism in section 46 of the EFCC Act.²⁶

In the case of *Musa Abdulmumini v Federal Republic of Nigeria*, the defendant relied on the defence of self defence and private property under section 59 of the Penal Code Law of Plateau State.²⁷ While the court agreed that the appellant was entitled to and in fact the court was bound to consider all defences available to the defence,²⁸ the question was whether a defence under a state law could avail a defendant when charged for a Federal offence. The Supreme Court stated a principle of law that the appellant cannot, ordinarily resort to the provisions of a State Law and invoke the defence therein to plead a statutory defence against a Federal offence for which he stands on trial. While affirming this principle, the court agreed with counsel for the appellant that insofar as section 46(a) EFCC Act which defines terrorism to incorporate violations of the criminal code and penal code, the defences in those statutes is also incorporated by implication. While we agree with the Supreme Court on the incorporation of defences in other statutes, it is submitted that this is a challenge to prosecutors who prosecute under the EFCC Act for terrorism. They must constantly look into those other statutes in preparing the charge rather than concentrating on the Act alone.

The case of *Adamu Aii Karuni v Federal Republic of Nigeria*²⁹ is significant on the interpretation of the commencement date of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. In this case, the Appellant along three others were arraigned before the Court below for the offences of conspiracy to commit a felony, i.e. terrorism, concealing information about acts of

²⁶ The definition of terrorism in section 46 of the EFCC Act includes any act which is a violation of the Criminal Code or Penal Code but intended to endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government body or institution etc

²⁷ The section provides that 'Nothing is an offence which is done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence'

²⁸ See *Ahmed v The State* (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt. 612) 641 at 681, the supreme court restated the principle that a trial court has the duty to consider every defence open to an accused on the evidence whether or not the accused person specifically puts up such a defence.

²⁹ (2016) LPELR 40473 CA

terrorism, committing acts preparatory to or in furtherance of acts of terrorism and being in possession of prohibited firearms and ammunition. Initially about 17 persons were arraigned but during trial, 13 others were discharged pursuant to a *nolle prosequi* filed by the Attorney General of Lagos State and trial proceeded against 4 of them including the Appellant. The Respondent called evidence; six witnesses testified and tendered 34 exhibits in its case against the Appellant while the Appellant testified for himself. At the end of trial, the Court found Appellant guilty, convicted and sentenced him thus the appeal to the Court of Appeal. One of the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge erred in convicting the appellant under the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013. That the commencement date is not indicated on the face of the Terrorism Act, 2013 and the omission would make the commencement date the 24 May 2013, the date the Boko Haram Sect was proscribed as a terrorist organization and brought to the notice of the public/the Appellant who is to be affected by it. Consequently, that the Act cannot be applicable because the Appellant was arrested on the 21 March 2013 before the Act came into effect. Furthermore, that the trial judge ought not to have relied on the Interpretation Act to find that the commencement date can begin from the date the Act was signed into law by the President because such reasoning can only be applicable to civil legislation conferring benefit and not a criminal legislation like the Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act which has heavy penalties. The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, agreed with the application of the Interpretation Act to the determination of the commencement date of the amendment Act. It held that the Act has no commencement date but had been assented to by the President on the 21 February 2013. This was about a month before the arrest of the Appellant. The Interpretation Act applies to all Statutes in this country and that where no commencement date is named in any legislation then such legislation comes into effect on the day the President assents to it. It is not in contention that, in this case, the Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act was assented to on 21 February 2013, a month before the Appellant was arrested. Furthermore, the argument that the Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act came into effect on 24 May 2013 is not supported by evidence. Since assent is done once,

and it was on 21 February 2013, there cannot be another assent of the President on the 24 May 2013. The Act did not say so.³⁰

Jurisdictional Powers to try Terrorism offences.

The Federal High Court located in any part of Nigeria has exclusive jurisdiction to try terrorism and related offences regardless of where the offence was committed.³¹ In order to expeditiously prosecute terrorism offences, the various courts have enacted practice directions.³² The Federal High Court Practice Directions 2013³³ was enacted with the objective of establishing a system of case management that will provide for the fair and impartial administration of criminal cases and the rules made under the practice direction. It is also to eliminate unnecessary delay and expense for the parties involved in the Criminal justice system.³⁴

Other objective of the practice direction includes:

- (a) ensure that at trials, parties focus on matters which are genuinely in issue;
- (b) Minimize the time spent at trials dealing with interlocutory matters;
- (c) Ensure that possibilities of settlement are explored before the parties go into hearing;

³⁰ The same conclusion was arrived at in the case of *Ibrahim Usman Ali v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2016) LPELR 40472 CA; *Alli Mohammed Modu v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2016) LPELR 40471 CA.

³¹ Section 32(1). This provision has taken care of the situation that arose in *Ibori v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1128) 94 where the supreme court held that although the Feral High Court has jurisdiction throughout Nigeria, territorial jurisdiction is still recognized by virtue of section 45 of the Federal High Court Act. See Nasiru Tijani, 'The Territorial Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in Criminal Trials-One of Form or Substance?' (2015) 7 *The Justice Journal* 1

³² See the Federal High Court Practice Directions 2013, Court of Appeal Practice Directions 2013, Supreme Court Practice Directions 2013, Practice Direction by the Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory dated July 1, 2014.

³³ Emphasis is laid on the Federal High Court because of its original criminal jurisdiction on Terrorism and related offences.

³⁴ This is a common feature of all the Practice Directions. See Labaran Shuaibu, 'Prosecuting Kidnapping Cases in Nigeria' paper presented at the 9th Africa Prosecutors Association Annual General Meeting and Conference held in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on 23 October 2014

- (d) Ensure that trials are not stalled by unpreparedness of the Court or the parties and that the case is fully ready for trial before hearing dates are agreed; and
- (f) Minimize undue adjournments and delay.

To achieve the above objective, the Practice direction made it an obligation when filing a charge to ensure the following:

- (a) The complainant shall not file a charge unless it is accompanied by an affidavit stating that all investigations into the matter had been concluded and in the opinion of the prosecutor, a *prima facie* case exists against the accused person;
- (b) The prosecutor must ensure that the accused is produced in court on the date of arraignment;
- (c) Where there is a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court to hear a case before it, the court shall ensure that the ruling is delivered within 14 days;
- (d) No party may serve a notice of an application on another party on the date scheduled for hearing;
- (e) In furtherance of the need to ensure speedy dispensation of justice, Electronic mail and other electronic means may be employed by the court in order to inform counsel of urgent court and case event.

With the practice directions, the prosecution of terrorism offences is given priority by the court and the prosecutor has the responsibility to assist in ensuring that there is quick dispensation of justice by his preparedness and minimizing delays and unnecessary adjournments.

According to Labaran Shuaibu,³⁵ a classic example of the speed by which terrorism cases can be speedily tried is the case of *Federal Republic of Nigeria v Mustapha Fawaz & Others*.³⁶ The case commenced on 29 July 2013 with the prosecution calling ten witnesses and tendering 27 Exhibits. The prosecution closed its case 3 days later while the defence opened on 2 August 2013 and also closed on 6 August and Judgment was delivered on 29 November 2013. Dissatisfied with parts of the Judgment of the trial court, the 3rd defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal Abuja Division³⁷

³⁵ Labaran Shuaibu, 'Prosecuting Kidnapping Cases in Nigeria' *ibid*

³⁶ *FHC/ABJ/CR/112/2013 (Unreported)*

³⁷ *Appeal No: CA/A/197C/2014*

and the Appeal was heard on 12 June 2014 and Judgment was delivered on 18 July, 2014. The matter is pending at the Supreme Court.³⁸

In the case of *Charles Ododo v Peoples Democratic Party*,³⁹ the Supreme Court in considered the guiding principles of the Supreme Court Practice Direction 2013 especially section 2(a) and held that terrorism and other mentioned offences⁴⁰ shall be given priority in the preparation and publication of the weekly cause list.

Sections 174(1)(a) and 211(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) confer the Federal Attorney General and the State Attorney General respectively with the powers to institute and undertake criminal proceedings in all courts except a court martial. These Powers can be exercised by the Attorney General himself or through officers of his Department. Private Legal Practitioners can also exercise this power provided if they obtain the fiat of the Attorney General.⁴¹

However, with respect to prosecution of terrorism offences, only the Attorney General of the Federation has the legal authority to prosecute. Section 2 of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 provides that the Attorney General of the Federation is the authority for the effective implementation and administration of the Act and shall strengthen and enhance the existing framework to ensure the effective prosecution of terrorism matters. It is submitted that nothing stops the Attorney General from delegating the power to institute and undertake criminal prosecution on his behalf to a state Attorney General or private legal practitioner⁴². In the case of *David Amadi v Attorney General of Imo State*⁴³ the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General can delegate the power to initiate and undertake criminal proceedings to officers of his department and in *Olusola*

³⁸ Appeal No: SC.418/2014.

³⁹ (2015) LPELR 24738

⁴⁰ Offences such as Rape, Kidnapping, Corruption, Money Laundering and Human Trafficking.

⁴¹ *Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Adewunmi* (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 399.

⁴² See *Serah Ekundayo Ezekiel v Attorney General of the Federation* (2017) LPELR 41908 SC, *Olusola Abubakar Saraki v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2016) LPELR 40013, *Ibrahim Shehu Shema v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2018) LPELR 43723, *Okon Bassey Ebe v Commissioner of Police* (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1076) 189, *Marcel Nnakwe v The State* (2013) LPELR 20941, *Godwin Pius v The State* (2016) LPELR 40657

⁴³ (2017) LPELR 42013

Abubakar Saraki v Federal Republic of Nigeria,⁴⁴ held that it can even be delegated to private legal practitioners. In the recent case of *Ibrahim Shehu Shema & Ors v Federal Republic of Nigeria*⁴⁵ the supreme court restated the principle of power of delegation of the powers of the Attorney General under section 211 of the 1999 Constitution.

Safeguards to the Right of accused persons.

One of the constitutional safeguards to a fair trial of an accused is the right to enjoy his personal liberty pending trial pursuant to section 35(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) by way of bail. However, the courts have been circumspect in granting bail applications in cases of terrorism irrespective of the constitutional right to personal liberty and presumption of innocence under sections 35 and 36(5) respectively. The cases show that the national security implication of terrorism outweighs the right to personal liberty. Hence the refusal of bail. In the case of *Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria*⁴⁶ the Supreme Court considered the appeal against the refusal of bail by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The appellant was arraigned on a five-count charge of conspiracy; treasonable felony; forming, managing and assisting in managing and unlawful society; publishing of false statement and being a member of an unlawful society. After stating the general principles for grant of bail, the court stated:

The pronouncement by the court below is that where National Security is threatened or there is the real likelihood of it being threatened human rights or the individual right of those responsible take second place. Human rights or individual rights must be suspended until the National Security can be protected or well taken care of. This is not anything new. The corporate existence of Nigeria as a united, harmonious, indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation, is certainly greater than any citizen's liberty or right. Once the security of this nation is in jeopardy and it survives in pieces rather than in peace, the individual's liberty or right may not even exist.

... entirely agree with the court below that a charge of treasonable felony is a very serious offence and is prejudicial to national security. I believe

⁴⁴ (2016) LPELR 40013

⁴⁵ (2018) LPELR 43723 SC

⁴⁶ (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 320 at 358-359; (2007) LPELR 958 SC

neither the appellant nor his counsel would sit down to fold up his arms, if on the seat of power, to allow any citizen to put his reign into terror and utter hopelessness or despondency while dancing to the music of a citizen who plots a coup d'etat against him. He will certainly fight it to the end⁴⁷.

This case was followed in *Ogwu Achem v Federal Republic of Nigeria*⁴⁸ where the appellant was charged on two counts of willfully providing money with intent that it be used for an act of terrorism contrary to and punishable under Section 15(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004; and providing economic resources in order to facilitate the commission of a terrorist act contrary to and punishable under Section 15(3) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004. He was convicted. He appealed against the conviction and applied for bail pending appeal. The court in refusing the application, relied on the case of *Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari v Federal Republic of Nigeria* and held that:

It should be mentioned that the applicant was convicted and sentenced for offences relating to terrorism which in recent times have grown in intensity and magnitude and have become a threat to our national security. Courts should therefore be very circumspect in granting bail pending appeal to a person convicted for any offence relating thereto. In the case of *DOKUBO-ASARI v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA* (2007) 12 NWLR (1048) 320, 358 -359, the Supreme Court gave its nod of approval to the refusal to grant bail pending trial to the appellant on the ground, inter alia, of threat to national security.⁴⁹

In the case of *Musa Umar v Federal Republic of Nigeria*⁵⁰ the appellant was charged with two others for breach of several provisions of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013. He applied for bail pending the hearing and determination of the charges against him. The trial refused the application. On Appeal, the court of appeal recognized that being a case of terrorism which carries severe penalty, the court must be cautious in granting bail. The court owes a duty to protect the society with proper regard to the security of the nation. The appeal was dismissed. The Court

⁴⁷ Per Muhammad JSC

⁴⁸ (2014) LPELR 23202 CA

⁴⁹ Per Ekanem JCA

⁵⁰ (2014) LPELR 24051

of Appeal held that the lower court was right in refusing the application for bail because of the nature of the offence. It held that the court, in an application for bail, owes a duty to protect the society and no principle of law demands that crime of terrorism.

In the recent case of *Salihu Abdullahi Danjuma v Federal Republic of Nigeria*⁵¹ the appellant was arrested and arraigned for charges on conspiracy to illegally import prohibited firearms and importation of prohibited firearms (661 pump rifles) into the country amongst others. The offence, was punishable by Section 1(14) of Miscellaneous Offences Act⁵² which attracts life imprisonment. It was held that the illegal importation of firearms has become prevalent in the country and violent crimes involving the use of firearms have also been on the increase. The trial judge refused the bail application on possible breach of national security. He held that:

The allegation is that they were actually imported and cleared at customs but intercepted on the road. This act itself is a breach of national security. What is more, it is a matter of public knowledge that Nigeria is still in the throes of violent crimes and terrorism manifesting itself in mass murders, kidnappings and sectional unrest. That to me is a matter of national security. What can be done with 661 pump action rifles in the hands of unguarded elements to me seems even more grievous than the threats of ASARI-DOKUBO in the case cited by the prosecution. Where there is threat to national security, issues of fundamental rights must take the back seat...

The appeal was dismissed. The implication of the above authorities is that irrespective of the constitutional right to personal liberty guaranteed under section 35(1) of the Constitution, in cases of terrorism, bail will rarely be granted as the offence affects national security.

Witness protection program and prosecution of terrorism cases

Witness protection is a system whereby potential witnesses are shielded from the members of the public so as to protect their identity and therefore presumably allow them freely give evidence. In that case, members of the public will be excluded from the hearing in open court.

⁵¹ (2018) LPELR 44543

⁵² M17 LFN, 2004

The challenge with the witness protection program is that it tends to conflict with the constitutional safeguard in section 36(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) that whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence, he shall, unless the charge is withdrawn, be entitled to a fair hearing in public within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal. The contention is that shielding witnesses and not allowing members of the public to be present except legal practitioners and parties is unconstitutional.⁵³ However, section 36(4) proviso expressly provided that: 'a court or such a tribunal may exclude from its proceedings persons other than the parties thereto or their legal practitioners in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, the welfare of persons who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the protection of the private lives of the parties or to such extent as it may consider necessary by reason of special circumstances in which publicity would be contrary to the interests of justice'.⁵⁴

In the trial of terrorism offences, statute has expressly provided for witness protection as an exception to trial in open court. Section 232 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, provides:

- 232 (1) A trial for the offences referred to in Subsection (4) of this Section may not, where the Court so determines, be held in an open Court.
- (2) The names, addresses, telephone numbers and identity of the victims of such offences or witnesses shall not be disclosed in any record or report of the proceedings and it shall be sufficient to designate the names of the victims or witnesses with a combination of alphabets.
- (3) Where in any proceedings the Court deems it necessary to protect the identity of the victim or a witness the Court may take any or all of the following measures:
- (a) receive evidence by video link;
 - (b) permit the witness to be screened or masked;
 - (c) receive written deposition of expert evidence; and
 - (d) any other measure that the Court considers appropriate in the circumstance.

⁵³ See the proviso to section 36(4)

⁵⁴ See section 36(4) proviso (a)

- (4) The provision of this section shall apply to:
 - (a) Offences under Section 231 of this Act;
 - (b) Offences under the Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act;
 - (c) Offences relating to Economic and Financial Crimes;
 - (d) trafficking in Persons and related offences; and
 - (e) any other offence in respect of which an Act of the National Assembly permits the use of such protective measures or as the Judge may consider appropriate in the circumstances.
- (5) Any contravention of the provisions of Subsection (2) of this section shall be an offence and liable on conviction to a minimum term of one-year imprisonment.

The constitutionality of witness protection in criminal trials has been considered by our court. In the case of *Col. Mohammed Sambo Dasuki (Rtd) v Federal Republic of Nigeria*,⁵⁵ the Complainant had brought an application at the trial court for orders granting leave to the prosecution witnesses to start enjoying witness protection by giving evidence behind screen to be provided by the court; directing that the identities of all prosecution witnesses be not disclosed in any record or report of proceedings which are accessible to the public; permitting all prosecution witnesses to be addressed with pseudonyms in the course of proceedings. The grounds for the application were inter alia that *the prosecution witnesses whose tour of duty involves carrying out covert operations for the security of the country will have their cover blown if made to testify publicly without any protection hence endangering public security of the country and that exposing the prosecution witnesses to the public will make them easy target of possible attacks from those sympathetic to the defendant who are feared to be in possession of some of the highly sophisticated arms and ammunitions imported by the defendant during his tenure as the National Security Adviser.*

The learned trial judge granted the application. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The court in dismissing the appeal held that the provisions of the ACJA, 2015 and in particular Section 232 is meant to further amplify the provision of Section 36(4)(b) with respect to certain

⁵⁵ (2018) LPELR 43969 (CA)

enumerated crimes therein, and does not in any way seek to annoy nor prevent the protective stipulations covered by subsections (5) and (6) of the Constitution, and do not conflict at all.⁵⁶

In another case of *Chidiebere Onwudiwe v Federal Republic of Nigeria*,⁵⁷ the defendant and others are alleged to be members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and were charged for acts of terrorism. The Complainant brought an application for leave to the prosecution witnesses to be protected by giving evidence behind screen to be provided by the Court; directing that the identities of all prosecution witnesses not to be disclosed in any record or report of proceedings which are accessible to the public and permitting all prosecution witnesses to be addressed with pseudonyms in the course of proceedings. The trial judge granted the application. The appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. The court relied on the earlier case of *Col. Mohammed Sambo Dasuki (Rtd) v Federal Republic of Nigeria* and dismissed the appeal.

It is pertinent to state that the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 empowers the court to protect witnesses by virtue of section 34. An examination of the section shows:

- (a) an application to protect a witness may be made by the court *suo motu* or by the Attorney General of the Federation⁵⁸ or other relevant law enforcement or security agencies such as the EFCC or the National Security adviser.
- (b) the section does not state the nature of the motion whether it will be *ex parte* or on notice. It is submitted that if the application is before the arraignment of the defendant, it can be made *ex parte* with liberty to the defendant to apply to set it aside. However, if the application is made after arraignment, the principle of fair hearing dictates that the defendant be put on notice. This will be so even if the court intends to make the order *suo motu*. In that case, the court must hear the parties to ensure fair hearing⁵⁹.

⁵⁶ See the decision of Barka, JCA. The foreign cases of *R v Davies* and *Ackerman J.S v Leepile (1-3) 1986(2) S.A 333* were not followed.

⁵⁷ (2018) LPELR 44499

⁵⁸ This will include officers in his department under section 174(2), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)

⁵⁹ See generally the cases of *Poroye v Makarfi* (2017) LPELR 42738 SC; *Alioke v Oye* (2018) LPELR 45153 SC

- (c) The overriding consideration for the court in making the witness protection order is to be satisfied that the life of the person or witness is in danger and take such measures as it deems fit to keep the identity and address of the witness or person secret.
- (d) The possible orders the court can may to achieve the purpose of the witness protection are:
 - (i) holding of the proceeding at a place to be decided by the court;
 - (ii) avoidance of the mention of the *real* name and address of the witness or person in its orders, judgments or records of the case, which are accessible to the public; or
 - (iii) issuing of a direction for ensuring that the identity and address of the witness or person are not disclosed;
 - (iv) undertaking the proceeding in camera in order to protect the identity and location of witnesses and other persons.

Further to this, the Act also gave the court the discretion to decide, in the public interest and national security that –

- a. All or any of the proceedings pending before the court shall not be published in any manner, and
- b. That such proceeding shall be adjourned and the accused persons detained pending when the Attorney-General is able to guarantee the safety of the witnesses and other persons involved in the matter.

As part of the witness protection program, the Act empowers the court to exclude all members of the public, except the parties and their legal practitioners, at the hearing in the interest of public safety or order.⁶⁰ When a court issues any relevant order, an act of contravention is an offence and person is liable on conviction to imprisonment term of not less than five years.⁶¹

The above examination show that witness protection is an available tool for an effective prosecution of terrorism cases.

⁶⁰ Section 34(4) of the Act. This is similar to CFRN 1999 s 36(4) proviso

⁶¹ Section 34(5)

Sentencing and sentencing guidelines in terrorism cases

By section 34(2) of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013, the court shall have jurisdiction to impose any penalty provided for an offence under the Act or any other related law. Also whenever any person is convicted of an offence under the court in passing sentence shall, in addition to any punishment which the court may impose in respect of the offence, order the forfeiture of any terrorist fund with accrued interest, terrorist property, article, substance, device or material by means of which the offence was committed, or conveyance used in the commission of the offence, which is reasonably believed to have been used in the commission of the offence or for the purpose of or in connection with the commission of the offence and which may have been seized or is in the possession or custody or under the control of the convicted person, to the Federal Government of Nigeria.⁶²

It is submitted that the implication of this provision is that the penalty under the Act is not exhaustive. If a law of a state provides for punishment for terrorism, the court will be empowered to impose the said punishment.⁶³

The Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 has also given general guidelines as to sentencing which, it is submitted will be applicable to sentencing for terrorism offences. It is provided that the court in imposing punishment shall have regard to the objectives of sentencing which includes the principles of reformation and deterrence, the interest of the victim, the convict and the community; the appropriateness of non-custodial sentence or treatment in lieu of imprisonment and previous conviction of the convict.⁶⁴

Nigerian courts have taken a firm position in imposing stiff punishment for terrorism offences. The rationale is based on the nature of the offence, its severity and the national security implications.

⁶² See sections 32(3) and 33(1)

⁶³ See *Wagbatsoma v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2018) LPELR 43644; *Musa Abdulmumini v. Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2017) LPELR 43723

⁶⁴ Sections 311 and 312. See generally, Code of Conduct and Prosecutorial Guidelines for Federal Prosecutors, Abuja Federal Ministry of Justice, 2013 28-29

In the case of *Adamu Ali Karumi v Federal Republic of Nigeria*,⁶⁵ the appellant was arraigned *inter alia* for acts of terrorism, committing acts preparatory to or in furtherance of acts of terrorism punishable under the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013. He was convicted and sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 25 years some of the terms were to run consecutively. The appellant appealed *inter alia* against the sentence urging that the sentence was excessive. The court of Appeal in dismissing the appeal stated as follows:

The gravity of the offence of terrorism which involves the use of violence or force to achieve something, be it political or religious, is a grave affront to the peace of society with attendant unsalutary psychological effect on innocent and peaceful members of the society who may be forced to live in perpetual fear. It is an offence that may even threaten the stability of the state. The sophisticated planning and execution of the acts of terrorism show it is an offence that requires premeditated cold-blooded organization. The circumstances under which such a crime is organized calls for appropriate sentencing to deter its recurrence by potential or prospective offenders.⁶⁶

The effect of this decision and similar ones is that sentence for acts of terrorism will invariably be strict. It is suggested that non-custodial sentences with the aim of deradicalizing terrorist convicts can be explored by the courts.

Code of conduct for prosecution of terrorism offences

Federal prosecutors have a code of conduct in the prosecution of offences including terrorism offences.

A general principle of conduct by prosecuting counsel is in Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners (RPC). It is the primary duty of the prosecutor to see that justice is done not to convict at all cost⁶⁷. The prosecutor is obliged not to institute or cause to be instituted a criminal

⁶⁵ (2016) LPELR 40473

⁶⁶ Per Ikyegh, JCA see also the dictum of Njirah JCA.; *Ibrahim Usman Ali v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2016) LPELR 40472; *Ogwu Achem v Federal Republic of Nigeria* (2014) LPELR 23202

⁶⁷ Rule 37(4) RPC. *Omisade v. Queen* (1964) NMLR 67, *Odofin Bello v. State* (1967) NMLR 1

charge, including a terrorism charge, if he knows or ought reasonably to know that the charge is not supported by the probable evidence.⁶⁸ Most importantly, a lawyer engaged in public prosecution shall not suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused person. If there was any evidence that will negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offence or reduce the punishment, the prosecutor must disclose the existence of the evidence to the accused or his counsel, if represented by counsel.⁶⁹ Some of these provisions have been captured in the Code of Conduct and Prosecutorial Guidelines for Federal Prosecutors.⁷⁰

Prosecution of terrorism offences like other offences must be carried out within the confines of proper ethics.

Prosecution of Terrorism Offences under International Law

There have been arguments that terrorism being a transnational crime, should be subject to international law and international tribunals, ad hoc or permanent such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).⁷¹ We shall examine the statute setting up these bodies to determine whether terrorism is a crime that can be subject to the jurisdiction of these courts and tribunals. The ICC was created by the Rome Statute with jurisdiction in four areas: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.⁷²

The crime of **genocide** is characterized by the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by killing its

⁶⁸ Rule 37(5) RPC

⁶⁹ Rule 37(6) RPC

⁷⁰ Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation & Minister of Justice, Abuja (2013) 12. The only set back to the code of conduct which is comprehensive has no force of law as that Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners which is made by the Attorney-General of the Federation as a subsidiary legislation. See *Adeboye Amusa v. State* (2003) 4 NWLR (pt 811) 595; *Abubakar v. B.O. & A.P. Ltd.* (2007) 18 NWLR (pt 1066) 319

⁷¹ C. Much, 'The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Terrorism as an International National Crime' [2006] 14 *Michigan ST J. INT'L* 121; J. Proulx, 'Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in the Post September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity?' [2004] 19 *AMU INT'L L Rev* 1009, 1034

⁷² Art. 5. These are crimes as at July 1, 2002

members or by other means: causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.⁷³

The crimes against humanity are serious violations committed as part of a large-scale attack against any civilian population. The 15 forms of crimes against humanity listed in the Rome Statute include offences such as murder, rape, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, enslavement – particularly of women and children, sexual slavery, torture, apartheid and deportation.⁷⁴

War crimes which are grave breaches of the Geneva conventions in the context of armed conflict and include, for instance, the use of child soldiers; the killing or torture of persons such as civilians or prisoners of war; intentionally directing attacks against hospitals, historic monuments, or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes.⁷⁵

The crime of aggression⁷⁶ is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, integrity or independence of another State. The definition of this crime was adopted through amending the Rome Statute at the first Review Conference of the Statute in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010.⁷⁷ Article 8(1) defines 'crime of aggression' as the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political, military action of a state, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

The 'act of aggression' in Article 8(1), is defined as the use of armed forces of a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political

⁷³ Art. 6

⁷⁴ Art. 7

⁷⁵ Art. 8

⁷⁶ Art. 8b is was inserted by resolution RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010

⁷⁷ On December 15, 2017, the Assembly of State Parties adopted by consensus a resolution on activation of the jurisdiction of the court over crime of aggression as of July 17, 2018. See <<https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works>>

independence of another state or any other manner inconsistent with the charter of the United Nations.

The ICC is intended to complement, not to replace, national criminal systems; it prosecutes cases only when States are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.

The court may exercise jurisdiction in:

- (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party; or
- (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or
- (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime⁷⁸.

It will be observed from the provisions of Articles 6,7 and 8 that there is no mention of terrorism as a crime for which the ICC will have jurisdiction. However, can the jurisdiction be inferred in any of these Articles? Should the Rome statute be amended to expressly provide for jurisdiction for terrorism?

We shall examine the statutory functions of the ICC to determine whether it can accommodate terrorism offences. This will be highly dependent on the cardinal principles for interpretation of international treaty. These are found in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.⁷⁹

Whereas Article 31 give preference to the treaty's text, Article 32 expands the interpreter's instrument to include also the negotiating history and preparatory work of the treaty. It therefore means that when a treaty is being interpreted, the court has to determine whether to use the literal rule of interpretation, that is the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty or look at the purpose the text was attempting to achieve and therefore draw new meanings into it as the circumstances change and realities pose new challenges. This second method of interpretation is called the supplementary means of interpretation. Article 32 states that recourse may

⁷⁸ Art. 13

⁷⁹ See <https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf>

be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 leave the meaning ambiguous or obscured or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

An examination of the crime of genocide enumerates that five possible specific behaviors when committed with a genocidal intent is a crime under Article 6. 'They are to destroy 'in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by killing its members'. There is an element of group elimination in genocide. Within the context of the Boko Haram terrorist group, they will not fit into this category although the present spate of attacks on churches and clergymen would suggest so.⁸⁰ This is definitely different from what happened in the massacre of Israeli athletes in 1972 Munich Olympic Games where eight Palestinian members of the terrorist organization Black September took hostages and later murdered eleven Israeli athletes. They can be said to be members of a national or ethnic group. It is our opinion that the Munich massacre can come within the jurisdiction of the ICC but not the activities of Boko Haram. There present-day attack cannot be isolated as being against only one group or another. Even Muslims are affected by the actions of the Boko Haram insurgents.

The crimes against humanity under Article 7, encompasses such crimes as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health etc. From the definition of terrorism in such statutes as the EFCC Act,⁸¹ it seems that this is the best provision to which the Rome Statute can be amended or interpreted to try terrorism even domestic terrorism. This is because, there is no reference to group elimination as in genocide or committed within the context of war as in Article 8.⁸² There is support for this view from some

⁸⁰ See David Cook, 'Boko Haram Escalates Attacks on Christians in Nigeria' <<https://ctc.usma.edu/boko-haram-escalates-attacks-on-christians-in-northern-nigeria/>> accessed on 27 January 2020, 'Boko Haram Executes Christian Student' <<https://www.persecution.org/2020/01/24/boko-haram-execute-christian-student/>>

⁸¹ See section 46

⁸² On war crimes

commentators.⁸³ The argument against this proposition is the definition of 'crime against humanity' that the enumerated acts must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. Can the present spate of bombings and kidnapping come within the definition of crime against humanity? We believe that the attack from the insurgents is directed against civilian population in the northern states in Nigeria. It is also systematic. The *mens rea* can be inferred that they knew the attack will result in murder, suicide attack etc. It is therefore our conclusion that the Boko Haram insurgents can be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. They are liable to be tried for crimes against humanity.

Whether the activities of Boko Haram can constitute war crimes under Article 8 that will be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC will depend on if the activities can be classified as grave breaches of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relating to treatment of prisoners of war. The attack must be acts committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes that is so recognized such as willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly etc. Since war crimes are related to armed conflict, it is our opinion that the definition of terrorism cannot be embodied in the Article 8 of the Rome Statute.

The definition of 'Crime of Aggression' was adopted at the Review Conference in 2010. It is defined as the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.⁸⁴ It principally involves act of aggression against another state. The individuals who did the planning, preparation, initiation and execution will then be liable for the crime.⁸⁵ It means that groups such as the Boko Haram sect cannot be for tried for

⁸³ See C. Much, 'The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Terrorism as an International National Crime' [2006] 14 *Michigan STJ. Int'l* 121

⁸⁴ Article 8bis

⁸⁵ See J. Lichtenberg, 'The Crime of Aggression and the International Criminal Court' *Tilburg Foreign Law Review* 13 (2006) 160,165

Crime of Aggression in the ICC. The actions of the insurgents are not directed at another state (state actors).

In summary, from the above analysis, we can say that in trying to fit terrorism within the definition of various crimes created by the Rome statute, one must contend with the scope and necessary intention to commit the offence. Hence crime of genocide cannot accommodate the crime of terrorism since the offence seeks to exterminate or destroy members of group in whole or part. The actions of the book Haram group cannot be brought under this head of crime. It is submitted that crime of terrorism can be accommodated as a crime against humanity. This is because the various actions of murder, torture, rape, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty, enforced disappearance of persons can as well be components of the crime of terrorism. War crimes and crimes of aggression would technically be impossible to accommodate terrorism, whether domestic or international. This is because terrorism does not involve armed conflict or other breaches within the Geneva convention for purpose of war crimes. The newly introduced crime of aggression involves the use of the armed forces of a state. This excludes terrorists' acts committed by non-state actors. It is therefore most unlikely to accommodate terrorism.

Challenges to prosecution of terrorism cases in Nigeria

One major challenge to the prosecution of terrorism cases is the absence of definition of terrorism and consolidation of definitions in various statutes such as the EFCC Act and the Criminal Law of Lagos State. Furthermore, institutional framework for the protection of the prosecutors of these crimes is lacking. Terrorist have supporters who are invariably not visible. A prosecutor and his family can be the subject of attack by fellow terrorists or sympathizers of the terrorists. In the performance of their responsibilities as prosecuting counsel, there should be no reprisal on his person or his family or loved ones.

Another challenge is the manpower deficiency in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases. The nature of terrorism requires specialists in investigation and prosecution. Lawyers in the Ministry of Justice are not adequately trained to handle these cases.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Effective prosecution of terrorism suspects is a major plank in the fight against terrorism. Mechanisms for this should be in place in form of not only the legal framework but also the necessary manpower and political will to carry it out. Hence the need to have a unified definition of terrorism, rather than the present situation where different statutes attempt to proffer divergent definitions. This will greatly assist the prosecutor and investigation agencies. Presently, there are several bodies or agencies that can charge a suspect for terrorism-ranging from the Attorney-General of the state such as Lagos where the Criminal Law creates the offence of terrorism to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission under the EFCC Act and the Attorney-General of the Federation under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act. There should be coordination and synergy amongst these agencies and prosecutorial authorities. Manpower challenges to effective prosecution in the form of prosecutors or judges will pose a setback. There is therefore the need for continuous training of prosecutors and judges. Finances for forensic investigation should be provided as the instruments of terrorism become more advanced. In fact, we now have cyber terrorism. Without the necessary funds and know how, the investigation and prosecution will be fruitless.